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Commanding International Judicial
Respect: Reciprocity and the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
BY SUSAN L. STEVENS*

Introduction
The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments has
become one of the most prominent areas of interest for many
countries in this day of heightened globalization, where international
commerce and trade have placed increasing demands on inter-state
efficiency and cooperation. While the United States has been
generous in its recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments,
many foreign countries have been unwilling to honor U.S. judgments.
Such disparity is due in part to the opaque nature of the United
States' foreign judgment recognition and enforcement system and in
part to the tendency of U.S. courts to unilaterally recognize and
enforce foreign judgments.
U.S. recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is
currently handled on a state-by-state basis, governed by state statute
or common-law. From a foreign country perspective, the state-bystate "system" is not a system at all because it provides no unified
procedure indicating under what conditions foreign country
judgments will be recognized and enforced. Foreign countries, often
with more unified and transparent foreign judgment recognition and
enforcement procedures, therefore have little or no incentive to grant
U.S. judgments reciprocal enforcement. This is especially true where
U.S. courts award large punitive damages in favor of U.S. litigants.
* Thank you to Dean Mary Kay Kane and Professor William S. Dodge
of U.C.
Hastings College of the Law for their guidance, editing and insight. Special thanks to
Professor Dodge who provided the original idea for this note and who continuously
supported my efforts.
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The Council of the American Law Institute (the "ALI") has
been working to make U.S. foreign judgment recognition and
enforcement procedures more transparent by drafting a federal
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments statute (the
"Proposed Foreign Judgments Recognition Act" or the "Act"). The
Council hopes the Act, when completed, will be adopted first by the
ALI as a whole (resulting in an ALI "Proposal") and then by
Congress to replace the "state-by-state" system. The ALI has been
primarily concerned with whether to include a reciprocity
requirement in the Act - that is whether to require reciprocal foreign
country recognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments before the
U.S. recognizes and enforces similar foreign country judgments.
At the inception of this note, the ALI was considering three
different versions of reciprocity (presented in ALI Council Draft No.
1, Nov. 20, 2001 or "Draft No. 1"). The first version mirrored the
current common-law approach, which does not require reciprocity at
all. The other two versions required reciprocity, but differed in how
to implement that requirement. During the development of this note,
the three versions were eliminated in favor of a single version, which
requires reciprocity and incorporates the concepts from both
reciprocity versions discussed in Draft No. 1 and in this note.
This note was originally written as an economic solution to the
ALI's problem of whether to require reciprocity and, if so, in what
form. Fortunately, the ALI's most recent draft (ALI Council Draft
No. 3, Dec. 2, 2002 or "Draft No. 3") reflects most of the conclusions I
reach in this note. I consequently offer this note no longer as a
recommendation of which reciprocity version the ALI should include.
in its Act, but instead as a possible economic explanation for the
inclusion of reciprocity in Draft No. 3 and as an analytical tool for
assessing different forms of reciprocity.
In Part I of this note, I outline the history of the influencing
principles of res judicata, sovereignty, comity and reciprocity on
conflict of laws jurisprudence. These concepts are then assessed in
terms of their contribution to the historical recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments practice within civil and commonlaw countries, specifically within England and the United States. In
Part II, I discuss the ALI Council's progressive drafts, specifically
focusing on the three versions laid out in Draft No. 1 and the most
current reciprocity version laid out in Draft No.3. In Part III, I use
game theory to construct two basic models in order to illustrate the
advantages and disadvantages of the different Draft No. 1 versions,
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and I identify the best strategy for the United States within each
model. Finally, in Part IV, I explain the advantages of reciprocity,
compare the reciprocity versions form Draft No. 1 and explain why
Draft No. 3's reciprocity procedure provides an optimal foreign
judgment recognition and enforcement strategy for the United States.
I conclude that the United States ought to enact a federal statute
with a reciprocity requirement, in order to prevent foreign country
neglect of U.S. judgments. From a game theory perspective, a statute
that requires reciprocity is always superior to a statute that does not
include such a requirement. I then discuss which form of reciprocity
is ideal for the United States, given the advantages and disadvantages
associated with the two reciprocity forms, and conclude that a
combination of both reciprocity forms is optimal. Finally, I discuss
the limitations of this game theory model and areas in need of future
research.
I. The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments:
A Historical Perspective
Conflict of laws jurisprudence is composed of three primary
building blocks: personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.' As with many
other areas of U.S. legal jurisprudence, one can best understand the
current approach to the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments by reviewing its historical development, here within the
larger evolution of conflicts theory. Comprehension of conflicts
theory is itself dependent upon a basic understanding of "res
jidicata," "sovereignty," "comity" and "reciprocity," concepts borne
from the concurrent historical emergence of the nation state and
increasing international commerce.
Historical legal scholars have suggested that the doctrine of
comity can be a solution to the problem of both respecting territorial
sovereignty and recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments.! In this
section, I will first consider the civil-law origins of res judicata,
sovereignty, comity, and reciprocity. I will then review the historical
practice of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
generally within civil-law countries and specifically within the
1. Michael Traynor, Conflict of Laws, Comparative Law, and the American Law
Institute, 49 AM. J. COM P.L. 391, 391 (2001).
2. Joel R. Paul, Comity in InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 6-7 (1991);
see generally Hessel E. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine,65 MICH. L. REV. 1, 9 (1966).
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common-law countries of England and the U.S.
A. Historical Notions of Res Judicata, Sovereignty, Comity and
Reciprocity
Early Romans developed the idea of "personal law," or the idea
that "questions concerning an individual's personal status, such as
family relationships, were governed by the law of the person's place
of residence or citizenship."' Roman law favored the recognition of
foreign judgments because Romans did not perceive judgments
rendered abroad as products from a "foreign" legal system, but rather
as resolutions of private disputes.4 Judgments were recognized based
on the principle of res judicata, the issue having been "definitively
settled by judicial decision."5
Roman personal law, however, was incapable of explaining the
legal relationship between individuals from different political
subdivisions, a flaw further exposed by the development of feudalism
between the 10th and 12th centuries.' The feudal development of
defined territories, where "the word of the feudal lord governed
anyone who came under his control," introduced the idea of
sovereignty, defined as "supreme dominion, authority or rule.., of
an independent state."7 Sovereigns were suspicious of recognizing the
law and judgments of foreign sovereigns on the basis of res judicata
because the foreign sovereign perceived such recognition as a threat
to his supreme dominion over those within his territory.8 The rise of
the nation state, borne from this feudal subdivision, and the increase
in inter-state commerce, exposed the need for a modified conflicts
doctrine to resolve increasing inter-state conflicts between
sovereigns.'
By the 14th century, Italian jurists developed the "statutist
doctrine," or a "system of conflicts incorporating elements of both the
personal law from the Roman system and territorial rule from
feudalism," to address the need for conflicts jurisprudence." The
3. Paul, supra note 2, at 12.
4. Friedrich Juenger, The Recognition of Money Judgments In Civil and
Commercial Matters, 36 AM. J.COMP. L. 1, 5-6 (1988).
5. Id.; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1312 (7th ed. 1999).
6. Paul, supra note 2, at 12.
7. Id. at 12-13; BLACK'S, supra note 5, at 1402.
8. See Juenger, supra note 4, at 6.
9. Paul, supra note 2, at 12-13.
10. Id. at 13 (Fourteenth century Italian jurists, in creating a system for resolving
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statutist doctrine:
was based on the idea that a court could determine the applicable
law by looking to the nature of the laws themselves. The laws were
categorized as real ["effective only within the limits of the
legislating sovereign's territory"], personal ["effective wherever the
affected person was situated"], or mixed ["laws that were neither
real nor personal"]."
Due to the rise of territorial sovereignty, judgments were seen as
"governmental acts [rather than mere resolutions of private disputes]
whose compulsory effect was limited to the sovereign's territory."'
The statutist doctrine, however, was incapable of resolving inter-state
conflicts between sovereigns where the sovereign faced the possibility
of applying foreign law within his own territory. 3
Ulrich Huber, a 17th Century Dutch scholar, created the notion
of "comity," or "courtesy among political entities.., involving
[especially] mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial
acts," to explain how a country's laws or judgments could have force
outside their own territory despite strict territorial notions of
sovereignty.'4 He stated that the sovereign power of each state was
limited to its territory, that the sovereign has power over any
individual found within his territory, and that where the sovereign
court decides to apply foreign law, it does so based on the doctrine of
comity. 5 Huber did not believe that sovereigns were required to
apply foreign law, but that they did so as a matter of international
courtesy. 6 Indeed, he argued that "recognition and enforcement rests
upon comity and that it would be declined when the interests of the
forum or of its subjects are impaired thereby."' 7
Huber's notion of comity enabled sovereigns to honor foreign
judgments and foreign legislation without compromising their
supreme intra-territorial power.'" Through comity, sovereigns could
conflicts between inter-state sovereigns, surpassed the work of earlier glossators, who
had merely commented on the Corpus Juris.)
11. Id.
12. Juenger, supra note 4, at 6.
13. Paul, supra note 2, at 14.
14. Id. at 15; BLACK'S, supra note 5, at 261.
15. Paul, supra note 2, at 15.
16. Id. at 16.
17. Kurt H. Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments
Abroad and What to Do About It, 42 IOWA L. REV. 236, 237 (1957).
18. Molly Warner Lien, The Cooperative and Integrative Models of International
Judicial Comity: Two Illustrations Using Transnational Discovery and Breard
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honor the principles of both res judicata and sovereignty.
Recognizing judgments as res judicata enabled sovereigns to
minimize the time and inconvenience associated with re-litigating
disputes'9 and accorded foreign court decisions respect. 2' As the late
legal scholar Friedrich Juenger noted, "[t]o retry cases that have been
authoritatively decided violates fundamental tenets of judicial
for the courts of one country
economy. Moreover, it is presumptuous
2'
another.,
of
judgments
to review the
Juenger believed that comity or "deference to foreign law
promotes the mutual concerns of sovereigns., 22 However, Juenger's
supposition seems only to hold true where the participating
sovereigns all honor notions of comity (at least insofar as the United
States has an interest in having its judgments recognized and enforced
by foreign countries). "Reciprocity," or "the mutual concession of
advantages or privileges for purposes of commercial or diplomatic
relations, was introduced in both civil and common-law countries as
a more advanced form of, or in some instances, a foundation for
comity.24 While civil foreign judgment recognition and enforcement
jurisprudence required reciprocity, early English common-law and
U.S. statutory and common-law jurisprudence did not require
reciprocity. 2' The non-existence of a reciprocity requirement in many
U.S. state foreign judgment recognition and enforcement procedures
has all but led to U.S. unilateral extension of comity to foreign
sovereigns, a relationship that does not promote the U.S. interest in
having its judgments recognized and enforced abroad.26
Scenarios, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 591, 599-600 (2001.) (stating that, as a result of
Huber's three guiding principles on applying foreign law within a sovereign's
territory, "international judicial comity was born as much into the world of politics as
into the realm of law").
19. Paul, supra note 2, at 16.
20. Juenger, supra note 4, at 5.
21. Id. at 4 (explaining that "[s]uch duplication is not only wasteful; it punishes
private litigants and exacts a toll from international commerce. To protect their
interests, parties engaged in multinational transactions must either resort to
arbitration or insist on advance payments or guarantees, which increases the
transaction costs of doing business abroad.").
22. Id. at 7.
23. BLACK'S, supra note 5, at 1276.
24. Juenger, supra note 4, at 7-11.
25. Id. at 9-10; see also EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 1187-1198
(3d ed. 2000).
26. Antonio F. Perez, The International Recognition of Judgments: The Debate
Between Private and Public Law Solutions, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 44, 63 (2001).
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B. The History of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments: Civil and Common-Law Countries
1.

Civil-Law Countries

The notion of territorial sovereignty was so pervasive throughout
civil-law countries prior to Huber's introduction of comity, that the
recognition of judgments even within political systems under a
common government was conditioned on governmental ordinances to
ensure recognition.27 For example, after the 1579 Union of Utrecht
united the Dutch provinces, recognition of inter-provincial judgments
was still conditioned on decrees that required judgments rendered in
one province to be recognized and enforced in another where the
judgment debtor had assets. 8 In France, the recognition of French
judgments depended on "Article 120 of the Code [Michaud of 1629],
[which] provided that the judges shall not refuse enforcement orders
to officers of other French jurisdictions, that they shall give them
without fee, without re-examination of the issue, and without hearing
the parties., 29 French recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments was, understandably, even less lenient.30 Article 121 of the
Code Michaud stated: "Judgments rendered ... in foreign kingdoms

and sovereignties... shall have no lien or execution in our
kingdom.., and notwithstanding such judgments, our subjects
against whom they have been rendered may contest their rights anew
before our judges." 3' Despite the 17th century introduction of comity
and the existence of the French exequatur proceeding providing for
the enforcement of foreign judgments, until 1964 the French court
"adhered to the parochial view that judges are not bound by foreign
judgments, but can review errors of fact and law."32
In many civil-law countries, however, the notion of comity was
eventually adopted based on the rationale that "whatever sacrifice of
sovereignty recognition might entail could be justified as the price to
27. Juenger, supra note 4, at 6.
28. Id. Judgment debtors are individuals resisting enforcement of a judgment,
while judgment creditors are individuals attempting to enforce a judgment.
29. Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 238.
30. Juenger, supra note 4, at 6.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 7; see also William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 1, 194 (defining "exequatur" as a system where "a foreign judgment
registered with the High Court would have the same force and effect as if the
judgment had been originally given by the registering court").
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be paid for inducing foreign courts to give extraterritorial effect to the
To induce foreign courts to recognize
forum's judgments."33
sovereign judgments on the basis of comity, most civil-law nations
conditioned treaties for the mutual enforcement of foreign judgments
on reciprocity."' During the 19th century, it was common to condition
foreign judgment recognition on reciprocity as a unilateral policy in
civil-law countries such as Germany, where reciprocity remains a
condition of foreign judgment recognition today.35
Modern civil-law countries enforce foreign judgments using the
exequatur procedure, which is simpler than the common-law AngloAmerican enforcement procedure of requiring an action on the
foreign judgment. In an exequatur proceeding, the judgment debtor
may resist foreign judgment enforcement on the basis of several
acceptable circumstances, such as by asserting that the foreign
country lacks reciprocity.37
Alternatively, many civil-law countries that require reciprocity,
as well as those allowing a complete review of the law and facts of the
foreign judgment (as France did prior to 1964), have entered into
bilateral agreements to circumvent the time and expense associated
with these procedures.3" Indeed, the effort to protect litigants and
international commerce from overly stringent sovereigns has created
a large increase in the number of international treaties between civillaw countries. The Netherlands, for example, conditions all foreign
recognition and enforcement on the existence of international
treaties.0
2.

Common-Law Countries:England

Early English common-law courts were liberal in their
enforcement of foreign judgments because they were prohibited from
resolving disputes involving transactions originating in another

33. Juenger, supra note 4, at 7-8.
34. Id. at 8.
35. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 &
introductory note (1987).
36. SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1196.
37. Id.
38. Juenger, supra note 4, at 8.
39. Id.
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 35, at
introductory note.
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country." With the rise of sovereignty, many countries chose to
honor foreign judgments on the basis of comity.42 However, English
courts did not premise recognition on comity, but instead recognized
foreign judgments through debt actions, wherein foreign judgments
were considered analogous to foreign law.43 The foreign judgment
placed a legal obligation on the judgment debtor to pay unless there
was "proof that the court rendering the judgment lacked jurisdiction
of the person of the defendant or of the subject matter, or that the
judgment had been obtained by fraud."" At English common law,
judgment creditors needed only file a new action in an English court
where the foreign judgment was conclusive.45
Unfortunately, continental European countries were dissatisfied
with this procedure because they did not feel it afforded their
judgments conclusive effect. 6 They were uncomfortable with the
English system because the English rules were not codified and
because the system differed from the continental European exequatur
procedure.47 Therefore, most British judgments were not enforced in
continental European countries because most required reciprocity as
a pre-condition for enforcement."
England responded in 1933 when Parliament passed the Foreign
Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act ("FJA") in an effort to
increase the recognition and enforcement of English judgments
abroad by using a foreign judgment recognition and enforcement
procedure similar to exequatur." Although the FJA only applies to
those countries that grant "substantial reciprocity of treatment" to
English judgments, judgment creditors retain the option at common
law to file an action on the judgment to enforce those judgments not

41. Juenger, supra note 4, at 9. Such disputes required that the jury be pulled
from the location where the dispute arising from the transaction occurred. English
litigants were forced to sue abroad where maritime and mercantile courts had no
jurisdiction. As a result, English common law courts, wishing to provide recourse for
their English litigants, had to enforce foreign judgments obtained abroad.
42. Id. at 9-10.
43. Id. (citing Russell v. Smyth, 152 Eng. Rep. 323 (Exch. 1842)); SCOLES, supra
note 25, at 1188 (citing Godard v. Gray, L.R. 6 Q.B. 139 (1870)).
44. SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1188.
45. Dodge, supra note 32, at 194.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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covered by the FJA, an option that does not require reciprocity."
Today the English legal system provides three statutory avenues
for the recognition and enforcement of foreign money judgments, in
addition to the common-law method of filing an action on the
judgment. 1 These are the Administration of Justice Act of 1920,52 the
FJA,53 and the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act of 1982."4
3.

Common-Law Countries: United States

Early U.S. courts, like early English courts, did not condition
foreign judgment recognition and enforcement on reciprocity.5
Instead, U.S. courts honored foreign judgments on the basis of
Huber's notion of comity." This approach was well described by
Chief Judge Kent in an 1808 New York case:
Foreign judgments are never reexamined unless the aid of our
courts is asked to carry them into effect by a direct suit upon the
judgment. The foreign judgment is then held to be only prima facie
evidence of the demand; but when it comes in collaterally, or the
defendant relies upon it under the exceptio rei judicatae, it is then
received as conclusive.57
As Kent indicated, while U.S. common law provided for the
recognition of foreign judgments without requiring reciprocity, the
actual enforcement of those judgments could not be realized unless
they were first recognized by a U.S. court." Unlike the full-faith and

50. Id. at 194-95.
51. SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1194-95.
52. Id. at 1194 (providing for reciprocal enforcement of English and
Commonwealth judgments).
53. Id. at 1194-95 (providing for the registration of judgments from
Commonwealth countries and foreign nations selected by the Order of the Council).
54. Id. at 1195 (implementing the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters with respect to
European Communities and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) member
states. The EFTA was added to the 1982 Act as a result of the Lugano Convention
of 1988.).
55. Id. at 1188.
56. Id.; see also 30 AM. JUR. 2D Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 779
(1994) (stating that "[j]udicial comity is the principle under which the courts of one
jurisdiction give effect to the judicial decisions of another, not as a matter of
obligation but out of deference and respect").
57. SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1188 (citing Smith v. Lewis, 3 Johns. 157, 169, 3 Am.
Dec. 469 (N.Y. 1808)).

58. RESTATEMENT
a and b.

(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note

35, at cmts.
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credit recognition due U.S. sister-state judgments, foreign judgments
were not automatically entitled to full-faith and credit by U.S.
courts.59 An enforcement proceeding, instead, took the form of "an
action by the judgment creditor to collect a sum [of money] due from
6°
the judgment debtor under a judgment rendered in another state.
The tendency of U.S. courts to enforce foreign judgments
without requiring reciprocity was called into question by the U.S.
Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Hilton v. Guyot.6" The Court held
that reciprocity was required for a court to recognize and enforce a
foreign judgment based on comity. 62 The Court first stated generally
that:
[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad
before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon
regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of
the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure

an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its
own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to
show either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under
which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any
other special reason why the comity of this nation should not allow
it full effect, the merits of the case should not, in an action brought
in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh. 61
The Court then limited the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, holding that comity requiredreciprocity.
[T]here is a distinct and independent ground upon which we are
satisfied that the comity of our nation does not require us to give
conclusive effect to the judgments of the courts of France; and that
ground is want of reciprocity, on the part of France, as to the effect
64
to be given to the judgments of this and other foreign countries.
The Hilton Court altered Huber's notion of comity by requiring
that courts do "not as justice and reason require, but as [the courts

59. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185,189-190 (1912).

60.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW,

supra note 35 at cmt.

b. This common law mechanism of foreign judgment recognition and enforcement

remains valid in modern U.S. courts.
61. SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1188-89 (discussing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113
(1895)).
62. Juenger, supra note 4, at 33.
63. SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1189 (quoting Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-203).
64. SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1189 (quoting Hilton, 159 U.S. at 210).
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themselves] are done by."65 Comity, as articulated by the Hilton
Court, was not "mere courtesy and good will" but instead established
some form of imperfect obligation on the forum country, an
obligation of reciprocity.66 Hilton dissenters, however, emphasized
that discretion is not part of the doctrine of res judicata, and argued
that it was the government's decision alone to create a reciprocity
requirement. 67
The scope of the Hilton decision was limited because the issue
before the Court originated from a federal court sitting in diversity.'
Hilton consequently established a rule of federal common law that
was binding on federal but not state courts. 69 As a result, many state
courts not expressly bound by Hilton refused to enforce the
reciprocity doctrine, most notably the New York Court of Appeals,
which expressly rejected Hilton's reciprocity requirement."
In 1938, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, holding that federal courts are constitutionally bound in
diversity cases to follow the law of the state in which they sit.71 Three
years later in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., the Court
extended the Erie doctrine to the area of conflicts law.7" Given these
developments and the limited reach of Hilton, it was assumed by most
courts that state law governed the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments and that, accordingly, the reciprocity doctrine was
no longer binding upon federal courts sitting in diversity.73 Whether
state law indeed governs the enforcement of foreign judgments is a
question, however, that has never been resolved by the U.S. Supreme
Court.74 Some courts have postulated that delegating the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments to state courts may be an
65. SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1189 (quoting MacDonald v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.,
71 N.H. 448,456 (1902)).

66. Paul, supra note 2, at 11.
67. SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1190 (citing Hilton, 159 U.S. at 234).
68. SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1190 (noting that the decision did not rest on a
federal question).
69. Id.
70. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 at Reporter's Note
cmt. e (1995) (citing Johnston v. Compagnie G6n6rale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381
(1926)).
71. SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1191 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64

(1938)).
72. SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1191 (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 487 (1941)).
73. SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1191.
74. Id. at 1191 n.5.

2002]

Reciprocity, Recognition & Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

"intrusion... into the field of foreign affairs.
suggests that:

75

127

Michael Traynor

Notwithstanding the recent development of "federalism" notions of

deference to state power, it should not come as a complete surprise
if, over a century after Hilton v. Guyot, the Supreme Court were
to... decide that the law governing the recognition and
enforcement of foreign country judgments implicates substantial
federal interests and is not exclusively state law.
The lack of authoritative import of Hilton, combined with
subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, meant that very few
federal and state courts required reciprocity.77
Except where
preempted by federal treaty or legislation, the modern common law
trend is for U.S. courts to recognize and enforce foreign judgments
(providing basic enforcement recognition and enforcement
proceeding requirements have been met) to the same extent that they
recognize and enforce sister-state judgments.7 To date, the United
States has not drafted federal legislation nor entered into a treaty
regarding foreign judgments recognition and enforcement.79
In 1962, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Bar Association adopted the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (the "Uniform Act").8'
The Uniform Act was adopted by and is currently enforced subject to
some modifications in twenty-eight states, the District of Columbia,
and the Virgin Islands.8 The Uniform Act was intended to be a
codification of the common law, and where adopted by state
legislatures, it provides a similar statutory method for foreign
judgment recognition and enforcement.82 It provides that courts shall
recognize and enforce foreign judgments, as they would sister-state
judgments, that meet certain monetary and procedural conditions.83
75. Id. (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,432 (1968)).
76. Traynor, supra note 1, at 401 n.21.
77. See SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1191. Although few federal and state courts
required reciprocity, some jurisdictions continued to follow and still follow Hilton.
78. Id. at 1192.
79. Id.
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 35, at

introductory note.
81. SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1192 n.1.
82. Id.; see also UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13
U.L.A. 261 (1962) [hereinafter UNIFORM ACT].
83. SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1192-93; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 35, at introductory note (recognizing that the
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The Uniform Act provides that courts shall give full-faith and credit
to foreign judgments meeting the appropriate criteria. 4 Of the states
that have adopted the Uniform Act only seven have inserted a
reciprocity requirement." The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations both reflect
that recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United
States does not generally require reciprocity."
While U.S. courts have been generous in their recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments despite the absence of treaty or
obligation, U.S. judgment creditors have had a comparatively difficult
time enforcing their judgments abroad."7
U.S. judgments are
generally not recognized abroad in part because of the tendency of
U.S. courts to award punitive damages and to grant "excessive" jury
awards." Furthermore, because U.S. courts generally enforce foreign
judgments without requiring reciprocal treatment from other nations,
foreign countries have had little incentive to enforce U.S. judgments."
In 1977, the United States attempted to enter into a bilateral treaty
with England on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments." Despite numerous attempts at negotiation, the United
States never reached an agreement with England.9 '
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, unlike the Uniform Act, is not
limited to money judgments).
84. SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1192-93. Criteria include: impartial tribunals and
foreign court personal jurisdiction over the defendant. "A judgment, furthermore
need not be recognized if obtained by fraud, if the foreign court was a seriously
inconvenient forum, if the judgment conflicts with another judgment, violates the
public policy of the recognizing forum or an agreement to arbitrate."
85. See Dodge supra note 32, at 228; see also UNIFORM AcT, supra note 82, § 3

(Supp. 2001.) (noting that, among others, Colorado, Massachusetts and Texas have
reciprocity requirements, and Florida recognizes reciprocity to be a permissive
ground for non-recognition); cf Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Construction and
Application of Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 88 A.L.R. 5th
545, § 7 (2001) (citing Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 612 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1980), which

recognized that reciprocity is not required for recognition according to the California
version of the Uniform Act).
86. Dodge, supra note 32, at 227-28.
87. Sean D. Murphy, Negotiation of Convention on Jurisdictionand Enforcement
of Judgments, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 418, 419 (2001).

88.

SCOLES,

supra note 25, at 1202; Murphy, supra note 87, at 419.

89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 35, at
introductory note.
90. SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1199.
91. Id.; Murphy, supra note 87, at 419 (the United States has never been a party
to any bilateral agreement or convention on foreign judgment recognition and
enforcement); see also Zitter, supra note 85, § 4 (noting that the United States has
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In sum, Americans have generally preferred to recognize and
enforce foreign judgments without requiring reciprocity. Although
Hilton introduced the notion of reciprocity to American law, it did so
by a divided vote, was not generally followed due to procedural
history complications, and has fallen into desuetude. Moreover,
reciprocity has met resistance by state legislatures, indicating that the
dominant American approach to foreign judgments is recognition and
enforcement without reciprocity. This preference has not promoted
the United States' historical and present interest in having its
judgments enforced abroad. As Antonio F. Perez states, we will
never know:
[W]hether continued judicial insistence on reciprocity would have

induced foreign states to recognize and enforce U.S. judgments or
whether the failure to conform to a policy of reciprocity evidenced
by the absence of incentives for strategic behavior is more likely a
moot question because intervening developments in U.S. law
frustrated any chance to achieve those results. 9'

In this note, I attempt to predict whether altering the current
U.S. approach to foreign judgment recognition and enforcement by
requiring reciprocity will induce other nations to recognize and
enforce U.S. judgments in the future.

II. Reciprocity and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments: New Possibilities
As mentioned supra in Part II(B)(2), modern U.S. recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments is handled on a state-by-state
basis according to either state common law or state statute where the
Uniform Act has been adopted. However, twenty-one states have not
adopted the Act, and even those states implementing the Act have
made a number of alterations to the language.93 From the vantage
point of a foreign country, therefore, current U.S. recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments is often unpredictable, and does
not usually require the foreign state to make any mutual concessions
to enforce U.S. judgments. Many foreign countries are consequently
reluctant to recognize and enforce U.S. judgments.94
implemented a Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards).
92. Perez, supra note 26, at 60.
93. SCOLES, supra note 25, at 1192 n.1.
94. Holly A. Ellencrig, Expanding Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Defendants: A Response to OMNI Capital International v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 24
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In response to the lack of recognition and enforcement of U.S.
judgments abroad, over forty countries are currently negotiating the
provisions of a convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of foreign civil judgments at the Hague Convention on
Private International Law.9 The ALI has been concurrently working
on the International Jurisdiction and Judgments Project to construct a
Proposed Foreign Judgments Recognition Act (the "Act"). 96 The
ALl was working on two draft statutes, as recommended by
Reporters Andreas F. Lowenfeld and Linda J. Silberman. 7 The first
draft statute, "Plan A," was intended to implement the Convention if
the United States became a party thereto, while the second draft
statute, "Plan B," is a draft federal statute of the U.S. recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments." At the December 2000 Meeting
of the Council, the Council decided to temporarily abandon all efforts
to draft a Convention implementing statute, Plan A, in order to focus
on Plan B, given the little progress made on current Convention
drafts and the likelihood the United States will not adopt the
Convention.99

Plan B, or "the Act," was presented for discussion to the
Advisors and Members Consultative Group and the Council, and
went for discussion to Membership in May 2002. "" Of particular
importance was the issue of whether the Act should require
reciprocity, where reciprocity indicates the United States would
enforce another country's judgments if that country enforces similar
U.S. judgments under comparable circumstances."" During initial
discussions, the Membership and the Council were reluctant to
require reciprocity, while the Advisers and Members Consultative2
Group expressed strong support for a reciprocity requirement.
Indeed, even Andreas Lowenfeld and Linda Silberman disagreed
CAL. W. INT'L L.J.

363, 382 (1994).

95. Peter H. Pfund, Intergovernmental Efforts to Prepare a Convention on
at
(Apr.
1999),
the
Enforcement of Judgments
Jurisdiction and
http://www.ali.org/ali/1999_Pfundl.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).

96.

REPORTER'S SUMMARY TO MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,

March 2000, at xi.
97. Id. at xv.
98. Id.
99. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT, ALI COUNCIL
DRAFT No. 1, at Summary (Nov. 20, 2001).

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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about whether to include a reciprocity requirement. 3
Draft No. 1 set forth three alternate versions of the Act."° The
first version did not require reciprocity. In other words, the United
States would be unable to refuse to honor a judgment from another
nation based solely on the fact that the foreign nation does not honor
similar U.S. judgments in comparable circumstances."
The second
and third versions included a reciprocity requirement in one of two
forms.""' The first form of reciprocity, "Reciprocity Version A,"
stated:
A foreign judgment need not be recognized or enforced in a court
in the United States if the party resisting recognition or
enforcement demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that
judgments of courts in the United States would not be enforced in
comparable circumstances in the courts of the state of origin. The
party seeking to raise a defense under this subsection may, in
appropriate cases, be required to give security.' 7
Reciprocity Version A essentially created a case-by-case
approach to whether a given judgment from a foreign nation would
be recognized and enforced in the United States. Alternatively,
"Reciprocity Version B" stated:
The Secretary of State is directed to maintain and publish (i) a list
of foreign states that accord recognition and enforcement to
judgments rendered in the United States; and (ii) a list of foreign
states that do not accord recognition and enforcement to judgments
rendered in the United States. A judgment rendered in a state on
list (i) is entitled to recognition and enforcement in accordance with
this Act, subject only to the defenses set out in subsections (a) and
(b). A judgment rendered in a state on list (ii) shall not be
recognized or enforced in a court in the United States. °
Version B created what is called a "list procedure" and
essentially created an "all-or-nothing" approach where the United
States would honor either all or none of the judgments from the

103. Interview with Mary K. Kane, Chancellor and Dean of U.C. Hastings College
of the Law and ALl Council Member, American Law Institute, in San Francisco, Cal.
(Feb. 2002).
104. ALI COUNCIL DRAFt No. 1, supra note 99, at 31-60.
105. Id.

106. Id.
107. Id. at 33.
108. Id. at 33-34.
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foreign nation. 9

Draft No. 1 also provided for other acceptable defenses to
recognition and enforcement that were common to all three
alternatives. " )
109. Id. Version B actually includes sub parts (1) and (2). However the
distinction between Version B(1) and Version B(2) is simply a burden shifting
provision to be addressed if a given country X is placed on what is called a (iii)
"neither" list. Countries placed on this list are those that are on neither list (i) nor
list (ii). "Inevitably, many states would not be on either list [(i) or (ii)], because no
experience with judgments of courts in the United States - or no recent and reliable
experience - could be collected justifying a place on one of the lists." I read this
comment to include primarily those countries that do not regularly deal with the
United States and/or those countries that are less developed. In dealing with those
cases, the U.S. court would make a determination of whether to recognize and
enforce the foreign judgment based on a burden of proof placed on either the
judgment debtor or the judgment creditor at the court's discretion. However,
because evaluating this scenario would involve complicated economic analysis, I do
not consider the "neither list" in my game analysis.
110. Id. at 31-33.
(a) A foreign judgment shall not be recognized or enforced in a court in the
United States if:
(i) the foreign judgment was rendered under a system which does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirement
of due process of law;
(ii) the court that issued the foreign judgment did not have jurisdiction in the
international sense over the subject of the controversy;
(iii) the foreign judgment was rendered on a basis of jurisdiction over the
defendant listed in § 6;
(iv) the defendant in the action did not receive notice of the proceedings, or
did not receive such notice in sufficient time to prepare a defense;
(v) the proceeding in the foreign court was undertaken contrary to a valid
agreement between the parties under which the dispute giving rise to the
judgment was to be determined otherwise than by proceedings in the courts
of that country; or
(vi) the judgment or the claim on which the judgment is based is repugnant
to the public policy of the United States.
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized or enforced in a court in the
United States if:
(i) the judgment was obtained by fraud that had the effect of depriving the
defendant of adequate opportunity to present its case to the court;
(ii) the judgment is irreconcilable with another judgment rendered between
the same parties in the United States or in a foreign state, provided that in
the case of conflict with a foreign judgment rendered in another state that
judgment is entitled to recognition and enforcement under the Act; or
(iii) the judgment results from a proceeding commenced after
commencement of a proceeding in a court in the United States on the same
claim, and the proceeding in the United States was not stayed or dismissed;
(iv) the judgment results from a proceeding undertaken with a view to
frustrating a claimant's right to have his claim adjudicated in a manifestly
more appropriate court in the United States, whether by an anti-trust suit
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The ALl has revised the Act two times since discussion of these

three versions.'" In ALl Council Draft No. 2 ("Draft No. 2"), the
Council removed the option of "no reciprocity," but maintained two
alternate versions of reciprocity (Versions A and B), both similar in
concept to those versions in Draft No. 1.112 They also removed
"reciprocity" from its inclusion in "[Section] 5 Non-Recognition of a
Foreign Judgment" (Draft No. 1) and placed it in a new section
entitled "[Section] 7 Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments" (Draft No. 2)." 3

Since their October 2002 meeting, the Council has again revised
the provision on reciprocity, and now submits in Draft No. 3 only one
version of reciprocity that appears to combine aspects of Versions A
and B from the previous drafts." 4 Section 7, subsection (a) is nearly

identical to Version A in that it requires reciprocity on a case-by-case
basis (subsections (b)-(d) then describe burden-shifting and
evidentiary matters related to proving (or disproving) reciprocity for
a particular judgment). "5 Subsection (e) is much like Version B in
injunction or restraining order, by a declaration of non-liability, or by other
means."
111. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT, ALI COUNCIL
DRAFT No. 2 (Sept. 30, 2002) & No. 3 (Dec. 2, 2002).
112. ALI COUNCIL DRAFT No. 2, supra note 111, at 5-6.
113. Id.; ALl COUNCIL DRAFT No. 1, supra note 99, at xi-xiii.
114. ALI COUNCIL DRAFT No. 3, supra note 111, at Reporter's Memorandum to

the Council and 5-6.
115. ALl COUNCIL DRAFT No. 3, supra note 111, at 5-6. Section 7: Reciprocal
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments states in full:
(a) A foreign judgment shall not be recognized or enforced in a court in the
United States if the court finds that judgments of courts in the United States
would not be enforced in comparable circumstances in the courts of the state
of origin.
(b) A judgment debtor or other person resisting recognition or enforcement
of a foreign judgment in accordance with this section shall raise the defense
of lack of reciprocity as an affirmative defense. Once the defense of lack of
reciprocity is raised, the judgment creditor or other person seeking to rely on
the foreign judgment shall have the burden to show that the courts of the
state of origin do grant recognition and enforcement to judgments of courts
in the United States in comparable circumstances. Such a showing may be
made through expert testimony, or by judicial notice if the law of the state of
origin or decisions of its courts are clear.
(c) In making its determination regarding comparable circumstances for
purposes of this section, the court shall, as appropriate, inquire whether the
courts of the state of origin deny enforcement to judgments against nationals
of that state in favor of nationals of another state; judgments originating in
the courts of the United States or of a State of the United States; judgments
for non-compensatory damages rendered in actions for personal injury or
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that it authorizes the Secretary of State to enter into agreements with
foreign countries setting forth reciprocal practices, and states that
those agreements will constitute "conclusive evidence that, subject to
its terms, the requirement of reciprocity has been met and that a
to recognition and
judgment rendered in that state is entitled
' 6
enforcement in accordance with [the] Act." "

Unlike Version B's "all-or-nothing" approach, however,
subsection (e) authorizes the Secretary of State to negotiate
reciprocity for particular agreements." 7 Subsection (e) also provides
that where the U.S. has not entered into a reciprocity agreement with
a foreign country or the United States' agreement with the foreign
country does not cover the type of judgment at issue, these facts by
themselves do not "establish that the state fails to meet the
reciprocity requirement.""' This statement has the effect of referring
litigants back to section 7(a)-(d), where they may have the
opportunity to prove or disprove reciprocity in accordance with
burden-shifting provisions laid out in section 7(b) on a case-by-case
basis." 9

The following discussion pertains to the three versions from
death; judgments for statutory claims; particular types of judgments
rendered by courts in the United States similar to the foreign judgment for
which recognition or enforcement is sought.
(d) Denial by courts of the state of origin of enforcement of judgments for
punitive, exemplary, or multiple damages shall not be regarded as denial of
reciprocal enforcement of judgments for the purposes of this section if the
courts of the state of origin would enforce the compensatory portion of such
judgments.
(e) The Secretary of State is authorized to negotiate agreements with foreign
states or groups of states setting forth reciprocal practices concerning
recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered in the United States.
The existence of such an agreement between a foreign state or group of
foreign states and the United States shall be conclusive evidence that,
subject to its terms, the requirement of reciprocity has been met and that a
judgment rendered in that state is entitled to recognition and enforcement in
accordance with this Act. The fact that no such agreement between the state
of origin and the United States is in effect, or that the agreement is not
applicable with respect to the judgment for which recognition or
enforcement is sought, does not, standing alone, establish that the state fails
to meet the reciprocity requirement of this section.
(f) A party seeking to raise a defense under this section may, in appropriate
cases, be required to give security.
116. Id. at 6.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 5-6.
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Draft No. 1: No Reciprocity, Reciprocity Version A, and Reciprocity
Version B. Although Draft No. 3 rids of these distinctions in favor of
one reciprocity version, the following game theory analysis is relevant
not only as a rationale for Draft No. 3, but also as an analytical tool
for the ALI and the United States should they wish to revisit the
three options from Draft No. 1.
III. Game Theoretic Model for the Current Proposed Federal
Judgments Recognition and Enforcement Act
A.

Game Theory and International Legal Strategy

Game theory was originally used as a tool to explain how legal
rules influence individual behavior.1 20 Over time, the role of game
theory in legal analysis has expanded.1 21 Law and economics has been
described as arguably the "dominant theoretical paradigm for the
policy analysis of tort, contract, property, and civil procedure" and as
a paradigm "equally penetrating when brought to bear upon private
international law. ' '122 Indeed, many lawyers have written about the
economic theory of private international law.1 23 I apply game
theoretic analysis to Plan B of the ALI project in order to explain
why the Act should contain a reciprocity requirement and what the
advantages and disadvantages are of Reciprocity Versions A and B.
Economic theory assumes that individuals are rational actors
who engage in cost-benefit analysis, according to their own
preferences and the values they assign to those preferences, in order
to behave in their own self-interest.124
This individual-based
explanation can be extrapolated to governments, where a rational
government ought to act to achieve the greatest possible benefits for
its citizens. A government, like an individual rational actor, will
engage in "strategic behavior" to maximize the total benefit to its

120. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 4 (1994). Please
refer to this source for general economic theory used in Part IV of this note.
121. Id. at 5.
122. MICHAEL J. WHINCOP & MARY KEYES, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM IN THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 3 (2001).
123. Id. at 3-4 (citing Buckley and Ribstein (2000), Choi and Guzman (1998), Hay
(1992), Kobayashi and Ribstein (1999), McConnell (1988), Posner (1998 at 645-646),
Ribstein (1993-94), Ribstein and O'Hara (1997), Solimine (1989)).
124. Michael Whincop, The Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues in the
Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 416, 418 (1999).
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citizens. 21 "Strategic behavior" occurs when a government's decision
is dependent on the decision of another government. 26 Game theory
can predict, given the choices of other governments, the benefitmaximizing strategy for the United States. 27
The basic components of any game must first be identified in
order to predict which of the three versions is the best choice for the
United States. These components include: the players, their possible
strategies, and their payoffs, which correspond to the strategy
Given these
combinations of each player taken together.12 1
components and the game's overall structure, a player's "dominant
strategy," or the strategy where a player is "better off, whatever
strategy the other plays," can be determined. 9
B. Reciprocity v. Non-Reciprocity: The Game
1.

Preferencesand Values for the United States and X

A game theoretic explanation of the advantages and
disadvantages of the three versions requires prior identification of:
the players, player preferences, values assignable to those
preferences, possible strategies for each player, and the payoffs each
player will receive for all strategy combinations.' Assume that there
are two players involved in the game, the United States ("U.S.") and
any one unnamed foreign country interacting with the U.S. ("X").
In order to construct a game, I make basic assumptions about the
preferences of each country. There are three primary assumptions I
make with regard to U.S. preferences. I assume that X holds these
same basic preferences. First, I assume, all else being equal, that the
U.S. prefers X enforcing a U.S. judgment to X not enforcing a U.S.
judgment. Assume that the benefit the U.S. derives from X enforcing
its judgments is some positive number "G." In other words, assuming
that most judgment creditors attempting to enforce a U.S. judgment
abroad are U.S. citizens and most judgment debtors are X citizens,
there is a net transfer of wealth into the U.S."'
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 419 (emphasis in original).
130. Id. at 418.
131. Given these assumptions, if U.S. judgment creditors seek enforcement of
their judgment in X and judgment debtors are X companies, if the judgment is
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Second, I assume, all else being equal, that the U.S. does not

prefer to unilaterally enforce X's judgments; where "unilateral
enforcement" indicates that the U.S. enforces X's judgments even
though X does not enforce U.S. judgments. Assume the loss in value
the U.S. receives from having to enforce an X judgment is some
negative number "L." In other words, assume that most judgment
creditors coming to the U.S. to enforce judgments are X citizens and
most judgment debtors are U.S. citizens, such that there is a net
transfer of wealth away from the U.S. to X '
Third, I assume that there is some positive number "A" that
reflects the savings a country enjoys in administrative costs when it
simply enforces a foreign judgment instead of re-litigating a claim.
"A" represents the difference between the sum of the court and party
costs of re-litigating a suit and the sum of the court and party costs
associated with bringing an enforcement proceeding. I assume that
enforcement proceedings will consume fewer administrative
resources for both the court and the parties because there are
relatively fewer issues in an enforcement proceeding, saving on time,

money, and research. Consequently, the difference between relitigation costs and enforcement costs should yield a slightly positive
number A, reflecting that enforcement is preferable for both the U.S.
and X.
In sum, the U.S. receives a positive utility from having its
judgments enforced by X and from the administrative cost savings it
enjoys from enforcing X's judgments. However, the U.S. receives a
negative utility for enforcing X's judgments because such
enforcement results in a transfer of wealth away from the U.S. to X.

The question remains, however, whether the U.S. prefers that both X
and the U.S. enforce each other's judgments ("both") or that neither
X nor the U.S. enforce each other's judgments ("neither"). Whether
the U.S. prefers both to neither or neither to both depends on the
relative magnitudes of G, L, and A.
Game theorists assign numeric values to illustrate player
enforced, I assume a net transfer of wealth into the U.S. via U.S. judgment creditors,
at the expense of X judgment debtors.
132. Given these assumptions, if X judgment creditors successfully enforce their
judgments in the U.S. against U.S. judgment debtors, then there is a net transfer of
wealth from the U.S. to X. This assumption ignores U.S. incentives to enforce X
judgments for foreign policy reasons or to save on litigation costs. This also ignores
scenarios where the judgment creditor is an American trying to enforce a judgment
against an X judgment debtor in the U.S.
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preferences. The U.S. attributes a value of G+L+A to the situation in
which both countries enforce each other's laws. 33' If neither the U.S.
nor X enforce each other's judgments, then the value each receives is
zero ("0") 34 The U.S. prefers both to neither if G+L+A is greater
than 0. The result indicates a net benefit to the U.S. when both
countries enforce each other's judgments (G+L+A>O), as opposed to
neither enforcing, 0. The U.S. prefers neither to both if G+L+A is
less than 0.' The result indicates a net benefit to the U.S. if both
countries do not enforce each other's judgments, 0, as opposed to
both enforcing (G+L+A<0).
Assume that over time and between the U.S. and X, G and L
have approximately the same magnitude, such that G+L=O. This
leaves only A, the administrative cost savings, indicating that where
both countries enforce each other's judgments, the U.S. receives a net
positive value from enforcing X's judgments. From this point on, I
conclude that the U.S. would prefer both countries enforcing to
neither countries enforcing because A is greater than 0 (which is the
payoff the U.S. receives from not enforcing). This conclusion applies
to X's preferences as well.
Finally, I conclude that neither couritry prefers to unilaterally
enforce the other country's judgments. Each country can only make a
decision to affect its own payoffs L+A, since, for example, G is
determined by X's decision of whether to enforce U.S. judgments.
Where X would not enforce any U.S. judgments, the U.S. would not
receive G (G=0), and would receive only a negative value, L, and
positive value, A, from enforcing X's judgments. This leaves the
question of whether L or A is the larger absolute number.'36 I assume
that L is the larger absolute number because any given wealth
transfer from the U.S. to X as a result of enforcing an X judgment will
133. Please note that I use zero ("0") as the normalized benchmark so that values
for G, L, and A are all relative to 0.
134. If there is no action by either the U.S. or X, then payoffs for each are 0
because there is no gain, no loss, and no administrative cost savings for either
country.
135. Later, in the n=2 game portion of this note, I determine that the U.S. never
prefers both to neither because the only situation where that preference scheme
would arise would be where X has a judgment type that the U.S. does not have.
However, I assume that the U.S. has more possible judgment types than any other
country with which it may deal. I will show, however, that situations do arise where
X prefers neither to both because there are other countries that do not enjoy
judgment types that the U.S. enjoys.
136. Where an absolute number is the value of the number without regard to its
positive or negative character.
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be larger than the administrative cost savings the U.S. enjoys from
simply bringing an enforcement proceeding. Therefore, I conclude
from this point on that L+A<O and that the U.S. does not prefer to
iunilaterally enforce X's judgments. I draw the same conclusions from
X's preferences, which are identical to the U.S.' preferences. The
values G, L, A, and 0 indicate player preferences for the remainder of
this note.
2.

The Sequential-Move Game

The game between the U.S. and X is a "one-shot," "sequential"
game of perfect information, or a game where both the U.S. and X
make one decision one at a time and have complete information
about each other's payoffs and, therefore, preferences.'37 "Complete
information" indicates that "each player's payoff function (the
function that determines the player's payoff from the combination of
actions chosen by the players) is common knowledge to all the
players."'38
The game is played in the following manner. The U.S. first
chooses whether to require reciprocity and, if so, which form of
reciprocity to require. Recall that the U.S. may choose no reciprocity
("NR"), Reciprocity Version A ("case-by-case") or Reciprocity
Version B ("all-or-nothing"). X then chooses which strategy, enforce
("E") or not enforce ("NE") U.S. judgments, produces the maximum
benefit for its citizens given the strategy chosen by the U.S. This is a
game of complete information and so the U.S. predicts ahead of time
which strategy X will ultimately choose given each U.S. strategy. The
U.S. will, therefore, make a first choice that is informed by X's
preferences and payoffs.
a.

Analysis 1: One Judgment Type (n=l)

There are two possible game structures I will discuss in this note.
The first, and the one I will describe presently, is a simplified model
that assumes the U.S. and X have only one type of judgment each
(n=1 for both countries) and that the judgment type is the same for
both countries. I also assume that the U.S. and X render an equal

137. See ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS (1992). I
do not consider the infinitely repeating game between the U.S. and X in this note.
But see Perez, supra note 88, at 57-63, for a consideration of the possible results of
the iterated model.
138. Id. at 1.
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proportion of that judgment type.'39 Under this assumption, there is
no difference between Reciprocity Versions A and B.'4" Version A
reflects the U.S. assessment of X's judgments according to a case-bycase approach, while Version B reflects the U.S. assessment of X's

judgments according to an all-or-nothing approach, where the
Secretary of State uses a list procedure to place X on an "enforce all
X judgments" list or a "do not enforce any X judgments" list.'4 ' When
there is only one type of U.S. judgment to be evaluated, the
distinction between Versions A and B collapses because there is only
one judgment type for the U.S. to consider. Therefore, whether to
enforce X's judgment type according to the procedure set forth in
Version A, like Version B, becomes an all-or-nothing decision for the
U.S. 42 Consequently, the n=1 game is only concerned with the
situation where the U.S. chooses between non-reciprocity ("NR")
and reciprocity ("R"). In the n=2 game, discussed later, I will
consider the situation where the U.S. and X have different judgment
types. This is a more realistic and, hence, more complex application
of the game.
In our simplified n=1 game, the U.S. has two strategies. The U.S.
can choose NR or R.' 43 If the U.S. chooses NR, then X and the U.S.
choose either E or NE simultaneously.' 4 If the U.S. chooses R, then
X will decide, after the U.S. has chosen R, whether to enforce the
U.S. judgment.'4 '
Because this is a one-shot game of perfect
139. 1 assume not only that both X and the U.S. have the judgment type, but also
that that type of judgment is rendered proportionally as often in X as it is in the U.S.
In other words, I take account of differences in country population by looking at the
number of judgments rendered as a proportion of the country's population. I
therefore do not assume that the absolute number of judgments rendered in the U.S.
and X is the same.
140. ALI COUNCIL DRAFT No. 1, supra note 99, at 33-35.
141. Id. at 31-60.
142. Id.
143. See discussion infra Figure 1.3.
144. See generally GIBBONS, supra note 137. Please note that the U.S. retains a
second choice of E or NE because this branch of the game involves simultaneous
decision-making. By the U.S. choosing NR, the U.S. has not committed to an
enforcement strategy in advance and both countries are free to move at the same
time. The U.S. and X receive payoffs corresponding to the combination of their
strategies and the U.S. and X know what these possible payoffs are ahead of time
because I am assuming these are games of perfect information. Note that this is
different from the other two reciprocity branch choices (Versions A and B) where if
the U.S. chooses reciprocity, then X retains the only remaining choice and the U.S.
will have to enforce or not enforce according to X's choice.
145. X could also enact reciprocity, but need not do so to enforce the U.S.
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information, the U.S. will choose a first strategy based on what
strategy X will choose given each U.S. strategy. First I discuss the
situation where the U.S. chooses NR, because the solution to this
branch of the game will remain constant no matter what value is
assigned to n.
If the U.S. chooses NR the result is that neither the U.S. nor X
will enforce the other's judgment because there is a coordination
problem preventing each country from ensuring the other country
will enforce the judgment.146 The coordination problem that prevents
the U.S. and X from enforcing each other's judgments, when they
generally prefer both countries enforcing to neither country
enforcing, is identical to what economists call the "Prisoner's
Dilemma.,1 47 I will first present the Prisoner's Dilemma theory as a
model for understanding how game theory is applied to the basic n=1
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments model.
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a game that represents the decisions
of two players, each suspected of committing a crime. The police
are unable to sustain a conviction unless they can obtain a confession
from one or both of the suspects. The suspects are placed in different
rooms where they cannot communicate.
However, this is a
simultaneous game of perfect information. Accordingly, each suspect
is informed of the actions available to both himself and the other
suspect, and the corresponding payoffs that each suspect will receive
from those actions. If both suspects confess, each suspect will receive
two years in jail. if neither suspect confesses, each suspect will
receive one year in jail. If one suspect confesses and the other
remains silent, then the confessor will receive
zero time in jail and the
49
jail.
in
years
three
receive
will
suspect
silent
The payoffs for each suspect are represented in a bimatrix where
each suspect has two possible strategies: confess or silent (See infra
FIGURE 1.1). Suspect 1 is denoted at the left side of the bimatrix and
Suspect 2 is denoted at the top of the bimatrix. The corresponding
payoffs for the combination of the two suspects' strategies are
structured as (Suspect 1, Suspect 2) within each box.
judgment.

146. See discussion infra FIGURE 1.2. There is a coordination problem where
neither country can make a credible commitment to enforce the other's judgments
because this alleged commitment is not itself enforceable.
147. BAIRD, supra note 120, at 33-34.
148. GIBBONS, supra note 137, at 2-3.
149. Id.
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Figure 1.1
Prisoner's Dilemma
Suspect 2
Silent

Silent

Confess

(-1,-1)

(-3,0)

(0,-3)

(-2,-2)

Suspect 1
Confess

Suspect 1 and Suspect 2 are collectively better off if they each
remain silent, because this strategy minimizes the joint sentences of
the two suspects. 5 ' However, if Suspect 1 confesses, then it is not a
best response for Suspect 2 to remain silent because confessing would
reduce Suspect 2's sentence from 3 years to 2 years."' The same
argument applies to Suspect 1 if Suspect 2 confesses and Suspect 1
remains silent.'5 2 If one suspect confesses, the other suspect's best
strategy is to confess.153

Assuming each suspect is aware of these

strategies and corresponding payoffs in a game of perfect
information, the "dominant strategy" is for each suspect to confess.'
Though remaining silent is the collectively rational strategy for each
suspect, the strategy "(confess, confess)" is the only equilibrium of
the game.
The U.S. and X fall into a Prisoner's Dilemma if the U.S. initially
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Whincop, supra note 124, at 418.
Id. at 418-19.
Id. at 419.
Id.
Id.; see also GIBBONS, supra note 137, at 1. A dominant strategy is a strategy

that is the best strategy a player can choose no matter what the other player chooses.
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chooses NR (See infra FIGURE 1.2). Both the U.S. and X have a

dominant strategy of NE because no matter which strategy the other
player chooses (E or NE) each player's best strategy is NE. The
payoff to both the U.S. and X for the strategy NE in the situation
where the U.S. initially chooses NR is (0,0). The U.S. and X are in a
Prisoner's Dilemma, where both countries would be collectively
better off if they could solve their coordination problem through a
mechanism to make their promises credible. The dominant strategy
(NE, NE) with payoffs (0,0) will always be the result in a NR
situation, so long as this is a one-shot game and there is no
enforcement mechanism to hold both the U.S. and X to a promise of
enforcement.
FIGURE 1.2

n=1
U.S. chooses NR
X
E
(Gu.+ Lus.+ AU.s,9
E

Gx + Lx + Ax )

NE

(Gu.s., Lx + Ax)

NE
(LU.s. + Au., Gx)

U.S.
(0,0)

Where the U.S. chose NR, as demonstrated supra in FIGURE 1.2,
there was a Prisoner's Dilemma where the dominant strategy was for
each player not to enforce the other's judgment, even though the
players could be collectively better off if they could coordinate to
enforce each other's judgments. However, reciprocity can be a
solution to the coordination problem resulting from the Prisoner's
Dilemma because it provides a mechanism for enforcing promises."'
If the U.S. chooses R, it promises to enforce X's judgment provided X
enforces the U.S. judgment.
155. See discussion infra Figure 1.3.
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In Figure 1.3, infra, the U.S. and X play a sequential move game
of perfect information, where the U.S. chooses R or NR first, and
then X chooses E or NE. In order to solve this game, I work
backwards, first deciding what X will choose and then deciding what
the U.S. will choose. This method is commonly used in games of
perfect information because it represents the method the U.S. would
adopt to predict its best strategy. In the overall n=1 game, X receives
a higher payoff from choosing to enforce, A, than from choosing to
not enforce, 0 (see solution, supra, from Figure 1.2). The U.S.,
predicting that X will choose E, will choose R because it gives the
U.S. a higher payoff, A, than does NE, which gives the U.S. a payoff
of 0.

Figure 1.3

n=1
U.S.
R

NR
(0,0)*
* Solution

(GUS, + Lus + AVs, Gx
.

US+

A

S x)

Factor out G + L = 0,

and above reduces to:
(Aus., Ax)

from

previous
page
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Notice that providing a reciprocity option allows the U.S. and X
to maximize the collective benefits to their citizens because it is a
solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma coordination problem. The
collective payoffs of the U.S. and X are higher than they would
otherwise have been had the U.S. chosen a non-reciprocity strategy.
This solution makes sense because where both countries, all else
being equal, would prefer both countries to enforce each other's
judgments (given payoffs G, L and A) to neither country enforcing
the other's judgments, this indicates that both countries want to
cooperate. Where both countries want to cooperate but are suffering
from a coordination problem, where neither country's promise is
enforceable, reciprocity can be an effective solution enforcement
mechanism. 56
b.

Analysis 2: Many Judgment Types (n=2)

I have determined above in Part III(B)(2)(a) that reciprocity
effectively resolves the coordination problem in the n=1 game
because, given the relative values of G, L and A, the U.S. and X both
prefer cooperation to non-cooperation. However, it is unclear if the
U.S. and X would still prefer cooperation to non-cooperation where
there are several different types of judgments to enforce. Perhaps
countries gain less from having particular judgment types enforced by
foreign countries, such that G+L+A<O. What is the best strategy for
the U.S. facing a country that may prefer non-cooperation? Is
reciprocity still a powerful leveraging tool for the U.S.?
For simplicity purposes, I assume that there are two types of
judgments (n=2).'57 Consider two alternate scenarios. First, imagine
that the U.S. and X each have two judgment types, judgment 1 and
judgment 2, and that judgment 1 is different from judgment 2.
Further assume that both countries render judgment 1 in equal
proportions and judgment 2 in equal proportions. If the U.S. and X
derive the same values G, L, and A from judgment 1 and the same
values G, L, and A from judgment 2, then both countries prefer
156. However, I will show that reciprocity is a solution to the coordination
problem only where the game is a one-shot game. The infinite repetition, or
iteration, of a Prisoner's Dilemma may encourage cooperation rather than defection.
In this case, promises may become enforceable because of development of trust due
to cooperation between players over time. Iterated games, however, are beyond the
scope of this paper.
157. Though in the real world, one could imagine an extremely complex game
where n=50 or more different judgment types.
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cooperation to non-cooperation for judgment 1 and cooperation to
non-cooperation for judgment 2. The result of this game is identical
to the result in the n=1 game because Reciprocity Versions A and B
are identical here as well.
If the three choices for the U.S. are: No Reciprocity, Reciprocity
Version A or Reciprocity Version B, the best decision for the U.S. is
still to choose reciprocity. The U.S. is again indifferent between
Reciprocity Versions A and B because if the U.S. adopts the case-bycase analysis in Version A, this is essentially the n=1 game played two
separate times, each yielding the same result, NE. If the U.S. adopts
the all-or-nothing approach in Version B, this is simply a bundled
form of Version A because the U.S. and X prefer cooperation for
both judgments. Reciprocity, in the n=2 game where the U.S. and X
each have two different judgment types in the same proportions and
receive the same values G, L and A from enforcement, is again a
solution to the coordination problem between the U.S. and X. This is
because both countries want to cooperate but require an enforcement
mechanism, reciprocity, to make their promises credible.
Consider a second scenario. Perhaps there are situations where
either the U.S. or X would prefer non-cooperation to cooperation, for
a particular type of judgment.'58 One could imagine a situation where
the relative gain a country receives from having judgments of a
particular type enforced does not outweigh the burden it sustains
from having to enforce a foreign country's judgment of that type.
The most obvious example where a country may prefer noncooperation is where a country is faced with enforcing a type of
judgment that it does not have. For example, assume a foreign
country does not have a strict liability regime and yet is faced with
enforcing U.S. strict liability judgments. The foreign country cannot
gain from U.S. enforcement of its own strict liability judgments
because the foreign country does not have any strict liability
judgments to be enforced. In this situation, the foreign country
prefers non-cooperation because G+L+A<O, since G=O and A is
always a smaller absolute number than the negative loss, L.
Assume for the n=2 game that the U.S. never prefers noncooperation because it has both judgments 1 and 2 and derives the

158. I exclude from this possibility the cases where the U.S. may choose not to
enforce an X judgment due to the circumstances set forth in sections 5(a) and (b) of
the proposed Statute. See ALl COUNCIL DRAF-T No. 1, supra note 99, at 31-33.
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same values G, L and A assigned in the n=1 game.'59 Assume that X
has judgment 1, but does not have judgment 2 and that X derives the
same values G, L and A from judgments 1 and 2 as does the U.S.
Where G+L=O and A is slightly positive, X prefers to cooperate with
regard to judgment 1. However, because there is no gain to X from
U.S. enforcement of its own judgment 2 (because X does not have
judgment 2), L+A<O and X prefers non-cooperation with regard to
judgment 2. Given X's conflicting preferences, should the U.S. still
choose to require reciprocity in the Act?
I solve the n=2, scenario 2 game using the same assumptions and
values used in the n=1 and n=2, scenario 1 games above. That is to
say: G+L=O and G+L+A>O (because A is a small positive number).
The U.S. faces the same three initial choices. The U.S. can choose:
NR, Reciprocity Version A ("R (Ver. A)"), or Reciprocity Version B
("R (Ver. B)"). O This game differs from the other two games
because there is a difference here between Reciprocity Versions A
and B. Here, X prefers to cooperate with the U.S. with regard to
enforcement of judgment 1, but prefers not to cooperate with the U.S.
with regard to enforcement of judgment 2. Please note that there are
now three branches in this more complicated game (See infra FIGURE
2. 1).161

159. This is safe assumption because it is difficult to imagine a situation where a
foreign country has a judgment type the U.S. does not also have. For example, even
though Britain is known to render more libel judgments than the U.S., the U.S. still
has the libel-type judgment.
160. See discussion infra FIGURE 2.1 for general structure of the n=2 game.
161. Note that the number of branches on the tree, if the U.S. chooses R (Version
A or B), has increased to account for all possible combinations of enforcement
decisions for judgments 1 and 2. Note that the U.S. decision of whether to enforce
judgment 1 is an independent decision from whether to enforce judgment 2. The
same principle applies to X. Therefore, enforcement decisions E or NE are listed in
form (judgment 1, judgment 2) only to illustrate the possible combinations of the
decisions, not to indicate that the enforcement decisions as per judgments 1 and 2
depend upon one another.
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2.1

n=2 structure
U.S.
R(Ver. B)
Rl

NR

(0,0)

R (Ver. A)

See infra
Figure 2.3

See infra
Figure 2.2

I turn first to a U.S. decision to adopt an Act with NR. Where
the U.S. chooses NR, this is a more complex but otherwise sufficiently
similar version of the n=l simultaneous-move game where the U.S.
and X both choose E or NE. The result in this game is identical
where both the U.S. and X will choose NE for payoffs of 0. This
results because, although both countries prefer to cooperate with
regard to judgment 1, one country has no way of ensuring the other
country will cooperate and there is, consequently, a coordination
problem. This coordination problem forces both countries to defect
to non-enforcement for judgment 1. In addition, although the U.S.
wishes to cooperate with regard to judgment 2 because the U.S. gains
from having judgment 2 enforced, X has no incentive (because it does
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not have judgment 2) to enforce U.S. judgment 2 because X receives
no enforcement of judgment 2 in return. X therefore gains nothing
from enforcement and thus chooses NE.
As noted supra in FIGURE 2.1, the U.S. will choose NE on both
judgments 1 and 2 due to a coordination problem, X will choose NE
on judgment 1 due to a coordination problem, and NE on judgment 2
because there is no incentive for X to choose E. The payoff to both
countries for choosing NE is 0.
Where the U.S. chooses R (Ver. A), X will choose E, for
judgment 1, and NE, for judgment 2, for a resulting payoff of A (See
infra FIGURE 2.2).62 R (Ver. A) permits X to choose to enforce U.S.

judgments (and thereby have its judgments enforced) on a case-bycase basis. X has judgment 1, and so prefers to cooperate, given that
it receives payoff G+L+A from choosing enforcement, E. X receives
G if it chooses E because the U.S. chooses reciprocity first and
thereby promises to reciprocate the action taken by X. Because
G+L+A>0 for judgment 1, X prefers to enforce judgment 1.
However, because X does not have judgment 2, it prefers not to
enforce U.S. judgment 2 because G=O and so G+L+A<0.
Where X chooses NE for judgment type 2 and E for judgment
type 1, X receives a payoff of A. X's choice of E for judgment 1 and
NE for judgment 2 results in a payoff of A for the U.S., should the
U.S. choose R (Ver. A). This result is clearly a better strategy for the
U.S. than NR, where the U.S. receives a payoff of 0. Because R (Ver.
A) is always a better strategy for the U.S. than NR given X's strategy,
it is not feasible that the U.S. would choose NR and I therefore
discard NR as an option. Next I consider whether Reciprocity
Version A or Version B is a best strategy for the U.S.

162. Please note that judgment strategies for this game tree are denoted (judgment
1, judgment 2). Corresponding total payoffs.for those judgments are denoted (U.S.
payoffs from judgment 1+2, X payoffs from judgment 1+2).
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Figure 2.2
N=2
U.S. chooses R
(Ver. A)
U.S.
NR
R (Ver.

B)

R (Ver. A)

(Enforce (E) type 1
E type 2)

(NE type 1,
NE type 2)

(2Gus + Lus +

Gx+ 2Lx+ 2A.)
Factor out (G
0) and above reduces
to:
(GU, + Au., (Lx +
Ax) + A.

(E type 1, Not
Enforce (NE) tyipe 2)

(NE type 1,
E type 2)

-

(GU.s. + Lu.. + A.s,
Gx + L, + A,)
Factor out G + L = 0

and above reduces
to:
A )
(

(Gus., Lx + Ax)
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Although (E, NE) is unequivocally the best strategy for X when
the U.S. chooses Reciprocity Version A, X does not have a clear best
strategy where the U.S. chooses Reciprocity Version B.' 63 This is
because Reciprocity Version B is an all-or-nothing reciprocity
requirement, where either judgment 1 and judgment 2 are both
enforced by both countries or neither judgment 1 nor judgment 2 is
enforced by both countries. Recall that X prefers both countries to
enforce judgment 1, but prefers neither country to enforce judgment
2. X's decision whether to enforce or not enforce both judgments
depends on how important it is to X to have the U.S. enforce X's
judgment 1 relative to the burden of enforcing both U.S. judgments 1
and 2. See infra Figure 2.3.

163. See discussion infra Figure 2.3. X's strategy is not clear from the conflicting
payoffs because it is not clear whether (G+L+A) + (L+A) is greater than or less than
0.

[Vol. 26:11.5

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

FIGURE 2.3

n=2
U.S. chooses R (Ver.B)

,oo,,

NR

U.S.

I
R (Ver. B)
R (Ver. A)

Solution
from
Figure 2.2,
supra
*

E type 1
and
E type 2
("all")

x

+ Aus, Gx +2L x + 2Ax)(0
(2GU.s. + LU.s.
Factor out G + L = 0 on left side, and
above reduces to:
(Gu.s. + AU.s., Gx + 2L X+ 2Ax)
Rearrange terms on right for simplicity,
and above becomes:

(Gu.s. + A,.,., (G,+ Lx,+ Ax) + (Lx, + A,))

NE type I and
NE type 2
("nothing")

)
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Please note that whether X chooses E, E or NE, NE is a matter
of whether (G + L +A) + (L + A) is greater or less than 0. In other
words, whether X chooses to enforce both judgments or not enforce
both judgments depends on the value to X of having the U.S. enforce
X's judgment 1 (G) minus the loss to X of having to enforce both U.S.
judgments 1 (L+A) and 2 (L+A). If it is more important to X that the
U.S. enforce X's judgment 1 than it is a burden to enforce U.S.
judgments 1 and 2, or U.S. judgment 2 represents a relatively small
portion of the total judgments, then (G+L+A) + (L+A)>O and X will
choose E. When X chooses E, the U.S. receives a payoff of G+A.
Therefore, if the U.S. thinks judgment 1 is sufficiently important to X,
such that X will choose E, the U.S. should choose R (Ver. B) because
the U.S. receives a payoff of G+A. G+A is greater than A, which is
the payoff the U.S. will receive if it chooses R (Ver. A).
Alternatively, if it is a greater burden for X to enforce U.S.
judgments 1 and 2 than it is a benefit to have the U.S. enforce X's
judgment 1, or U.S. judgment 2 represents a relatively large portion
of the total judgments, then (G+L+A) + (L+A)<0 and X's best
strategy is NE. When X chooses NE, the U.S. receives a payoff of 0.
Therefore, if the U.S. thinks judgment 1 is not very important to X,
such that X will choose NE because it does not want to be burdened
with enforcing both U.S. judgments, the U.S. should choose R (Ver.
A). The U.S. receives a payoff of A should X choose NE for
judgment 2 under an Act requiring R (Ver. A), but only 0 when X
chooses NE under an Act requiring R (Ver. B).
The result of the n=2 game is that some form of reciprocity is
always a better strategy for the U.S. than no reciprocity, where the
U.S. prefers both the U.S. and X to enforce every U.S. judgment type
and X prefers both the U.S. and X to enforce at least one of its
judgment types. Reciprocity is, under these circumstances, an
enforcement mechanism solution to the coordination problem
resulting from the Prisoner's Dilemma discussed in the n=1 game.
Both the U.S. and X prefer to cooperate and enforce judgment 1 and
reciprocity either ensures cooperation on a piecemeal basis
(Reciprocity Version A) or on a leveraged basis (Reciprocity Version
B). Where judgment 1 is sufficiently important to X, or where
judgment 2 comprises a relatively small proportion of the total
judgments, the U.S. can leverage in X's enforcement of U.S.
judgment 2 by requiring Reciprocity Version B. Under Reciprocity
Version B, the Secretary of State would have the power to create
public policy incentives to induce other nations to recognize and
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enforce U.S. judgments.' 64 However, where judgment 1 is not
sufficiently important to X, or where judgment 2 comprises a
relatively large proportion of the total judgments, the U.S. can retain
enforcement of at least some of its judgment types (here, judgment 1)
by requiring Reciprocity Version A. Some X enforcement of U.S.
judgments is better than no enforcement, where the U.S. receives a
payoff of 0.
IV. Conclusion: The Game Theoretic Prediction for a
Successful Federal Statute
Given the game theoretic solutions from the above models, it
makes sense that the ALI Council has included a reciprocity
requirement in its most recent draft because reciprocity would enable
the U.S. to confer the largest possible benefit on its citizens. I offer
this note as an economic justification for the ALI's current draft,
which includes reciprocity, and as an analytical reference tool for the
U.S. should the ALI once again consider including either Version A
or Version B in its ultimate proposal or should the U.S. consider
these three alternatives regardless of the ALI's ultimate proposal.
Consequently it is still necessary to determine whether Reciprocity
Version A or Reciprocity Version B is superior.
In order to determine whether Version A is superior to Version
B for the U.S., it is necessary to determine whether the benefit a
foreign country derives from having its judgments enforced exceeds
the burden of having to enforce both similar U.S. judgment types and
U.S. judgment types X itself may not carry. If X is sufficiently
concerned about having its own judgments enforced, or the
enforcement of U.S. judgments, including those judgments X does not
carry, is a relatively small burden, then the U.S. should choose to
adopt Version B. Version B enables the Secretary of State to
leverage in the enforcement of U.S. judgment types not carried by X,
as well as possible compromises on other public policy issues.
If X is not sufficiently concerned about having its judgments
enforced to enforce U.S. judgments itself, including those it does not
carry, or the enforcement of U.S. judgments X does not carry is a
relatively large burden, then the U.S. should choose to adopt Version
A. Version A enables the U.S. to gain enforcement of at least some
U.S. judgments because it requires case-by-case analysis.

164. ALl COUNCIL DRAVr

No. 1, supra note 99, at 33-34.

2002]

Reciprocity, Recognition & Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

155

While the U.S. should choose to adopt these strategies when
dealing with only one foreign country, X, the U.S. must realistically
consider its relationship with many foreign countries before choosing
which federal statute version is appropriate. Where "n" is equal to
some number larger than two, the U.S. must interact with many
foreign countries that differ widely about which laws are important to
them. Given the ALI's three versions and the solutions from the n=2
game, the best strategy for the U.S. is to adopt Reciprocity Version
A. Version A grants the U.S. the flexibility it requires to
accommodate the different preferences of multiple countries and
should, therefore, result in the largest number of U.S. judgments
recognized and enforced abroad. Version A is only the best solution,
however, where Version B has only two lists and most foreign
countries would prefer to be on the non-enforcement list because the
burden from enforcing all U.S. judgments outweighs the benefit of
having their own judgments enforced.
The best and most flexible solution for the U.S. would be for the
U.S. to adopt a federal statute that looks like the ALI's current draft.
Draft No. 3 combines the flexibility of the case-by-case approach
from Version A with a softer version of the leveraging power from
the all-or-nothing procedure of Version B. The foundation for this
dynamic combination was laid out in a third default list mentioned in
Reciprocity Version B (and outlined in endnote 109). The ALI
created a third "neither" list because "many states would not be on
either list [(i) or (ii)], because no experience with judgments of courts
in the United States - or no recent and reliable experience - could be

collected justifying a place on one of the lists.' ' 65 For countries on list
(iii), the U.S. court would make a determination of whether to
recognize and enforce the foreign judgment based on a burden of
proof placed on either the judgment debtor or the judgment creditor
at the court's discretion. Because evaluating this scenario would have
demanded extremely complicated game theory analysis, I did not
consider list (iii) in my analysis.
I did not consider this third list in the game theory model
because the language in Draft No. 1 suggested that only those
countries that do not regularly deal with the U.S. and/or those
countries that are less developed were likely to be placed on list (iii).
This list would involve a relatively inconsequential group of countries
from the perspective of the U.S.
165. Id. at 59.
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In Draft No. 3, however, the ALI Council eliminated the "all-ornothing" approach in favor of language that authorizes the Secretary
of State to negotiate reciprocity agreements with foreign countries,
where such agreements would, subject to the terms of the agreement,
be conclusive evidence of reciprocity. 66 This approach is far more
flexible than Version B's approach because it allows the Secretary of
State to negotiate reciprocity for particular judgment types, and
eliminates the bright-line threat of foreign country placement on a
"nothing" list.
In fact, section 7(e) provides that even in instances where the
U.S. has not entered into a reciprocity agreement with X, or the U.S.
agreement with X does not cover the type of judgment at issue, these
facts by themselves do not "establish that the state fails to meet the
reciprocity requirement.' 67 This statement has the effect of referring
litigants back to a Version A-type approach, as now laid out in
section 7(a)-(d), where they may have the opportunity to prove or
disprove reciprocity in accordance with burden-shifting provisions
laid out in section 7(b) on a case-by-case basis.'"
Although section 7(e) would seem to decrease the U.S.' power to
leverage in those judgments foreign countries would otherwise be
unwilling to enforce if they were not faced with the threat of zero U.S.
enforcement of their judgments, it is likely the U.S. will still retain
sufficient leveraging power. For example, one could imagine a
situation where the U.S. would refuse to enter into an agreement with
X unless X agreed to enforce a judgment type it would rather not
enforce. The U.S. threat not to enter into an agreement would
conceivably be credible where the U.S. currently enforces many of
X's judgments, enforcing the U.S. judgment in debate would not
impose an inordinately high cost upon X, and an agreement would
save X judgment creditors considerable time and money in getting
their judgments enforced.
This note has attempted to simplify the U.S. recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments strategy and in so doing, has left
open several areas for future research. First, it is worth noting that
there may be certain judgment types the U.S. and/or X may prefer to
unilaterally enforce. Here, reciprocity may not be an ideal solution
because, while the U.S. benefits from achieving coordination on
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certain judgments through reciprocity, the U.S. may be prevented
from enforcing others it would prefer to unilaterally enforce should X
choose non-enforcement for those judgment types. In this situation,
it is conceivable that non-reciprocity is the best choice for the U.S.
Second, to simplify our analysis, I drew the conclusion that the
gains and losses from enforcement are essentially equal. However,
this conclusion presumes that the relative risks of loss faced by both
countries are equal. In fact, one could imagine a situation where the
U.S. has a greater risk of loss (where L exceeds G) because it has
more U.S. companies in the foreign country than the foreign country
has companies in the U.S. Because of this possible asymmetry, where
the U.S. has exposed itself to a larger potential liability in the foreign
country than the foreign country has in the U.S., the U.S. may have
different preferences. This could be a valuable area for continued
research.
Finally, reciprocity may be an unnecessary solution for the
iterated form of the game discussed in this note. Where the game is
repeated, enforcement of foreign judgments may signal that the U.S.
is willing to cooperate.'69 The lack of foreign cooperation may simply
be due to the current unpredictability of the U.S. state system of
recognition and enforcement. Accordingly, it may be sufficient for
the U.S. to signal cooperation by simply adopting a federal statute
that does not necessarily require reciprocity. . However, given the
U.S.' historically generous approach to foreign judgment recognition
and enforcement and the concurrent foreign country neglect of
similar U.S. judgments, this theory does not seem likely to induce
foreign countries to cooperate.
While it is admirable and advisable for the U.S. to recognize and
enforce foreign judgments on the basis of comity, that is, out of
international courtesy, it is unlikely that Huber perceived
international courtesy as a unilateral function. Indeed, Huber placed
forum law above foreign law where appropriate."' Perhaps Juenger's
interpretation of deference to foreign law as promoting the mutual
interests of sovereigns suggests that comity should be closer in
169. Perez, supra note 26, at 60 (stating that "in an iterated or repeated game
cooperation is possible through strategic signaling. This signaling of future
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function to reciprocity.'7' The U.S. Supreme Court in Hilton, may
have been wise to this practical definition, and may have introduced
reciprocity as a pre-condition to comity in an effort to avoid the
foreign neglect of U.S. judgment recognition and enforcement that
followed.7 2 What is clear from foreign judgment recognition and
enforcement jurisprudence is that it is time for the U.S. to stop
honoring foreign judgments without receiving some judicial respect in
return. The adoption of a federal foreign judgment recognition and
enforcement statute that requires reciprocity in accordance with the
procedure currently laid out in Draft No. 3, may be just the lever the
U.S. needs to ensure its judgment creditors have a voice abroad.
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